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YELLOW SNOW ON SACRED SITES: A FAILED




"Holy means it is set apart. It is like the sanctuary of a church; you would
not want to desecrate a sacred place. This is a holy place and it should remain
holy."' Many religious believers would agree with the first sentence of this
quote-that holy places are distinguished from all other places. Yet the lack of
understanding of what "holy" means to religious followers lies at the heart of
a dispute over the San Francisco Peaks in Northern Arizona. The Peaks are
sacred to thirteen Native American tribes or chapters.2 Perhaps analogizing
what is holy to the tribes to the sanctuary of a church allows a greater
understanding of the plight these tribes face. Imagine for a moment that you are
a religious follower and your holy site, the one you hold most dear, will be
doused daily with recycled sewage. Would you be consoled by the fact that the
sewage effluent contains only trace particles of human waste? Would you feel
better knowing that a private corporation is experiencing a higher profit margin
because of the burden placed on your holy site?
This is the problem encountered by the Native American tribes in Navajo
Nation v. United States Forest Service.' The holy lands that are dear to these
tribes are owned by the federal government, which has approved a proposal to
expand a ski resort known as the Snowbowl.4 The proposal is focused on
pumping 1.5 million gallons of sewage effluent per day from the nearby city of
Flagstaff, Arizona to the Peaks in order to manufacture artificial snow for the
Snowbowl.' The purpose of the plan is to improve the economic viability ofthe
ski resort, which has suffered diminished profits from decreased annual
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Daniel Kraker, On Sacred Snow: Culture and Commerce Clash over Development on
Arizona's San Francisco Peaks, AM. INDIAN REP., Apr. 2004, at 6, 6 (quoting Hopi Vice Chair
Caleb Johnson).
2. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
3. 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
4. Id. at 1064-65.
5. Id. at 1081 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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snowfall.' Attempting to halt the plan, the tribes initiated suit against the U.S.
Forest Service on a variety of claims. This note will focus on their claim under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).'
Congress passed RFRA in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Employment Division, Department ofHuman Resources v. Smith, which held
that the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause offers no protection against
laws of general applicability that nevertheless burden religion.' Congress
recognized that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
in Smith was a departure from previous case law and was insufficient to
adequately protect the free exercise of religion. In response, it expanded the
First Amendment's protections by enacting RFRA.'o RFRA prohibits
government action substantially burdening religion unless it furthers a
compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' application of RFRA in
Navajo Nation has rendered the statute and the protections conceived by
Congress useless.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of RFRA in Navajo Nation is too narrow
to fulfill Congress's intent of expanding First Amendment protection. The
court interpreted "substantial burden" to fit only the facts of previous Supreme
Court cases in lieu of independently determining whether the use of sewage
effluent on the Snowbowl places a substantial burden on the tribes' exercise of
religion.12 This has the effect of completely undermining the congressional
intent of RFRA, which was to expand the protection proffered to religious
expression.13
Part II of this note will first describe the facts of Navajo Nation and the
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit. Next, Part IH explains the background of the
modern Free Exercise framework and the cause and evolution of RFRA.
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the approach taken by the Ninth
Circuit and the dangers posed to the free exercise of religion under RFRA.
6. Id. at 1065.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2006).
8. Id. § 2000bb(a)(4).
9. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-84 (1990).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a).
11. Id. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b).
12. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).




II. Statement of the Case
A. The San Francisco Peaks
At the heart of this case are the San Francisco Peaks, located in the Coconino
National Forest just north of Flagstaff, Arizona.' 4 The Peaks are historically
sacred to numerous Indian tribes, including the Navajos and the Hopis.15 The
Navajo people view the Peaks as one of their most sacred sites.'" Navajo
medicine men collect soil and herbs from the Peaks for use in healing
ceremonies.'" In addition, various rocks, plants, and trees are gathered from the
Peaks by the Navajos for use in ceremonies and day-to-day activities." The
Navajos recognize the Peaks as a source for water and go there to offer prayers
for rain.'9
The Peaks are known to the Hopi as Nuvatukyaovi, the "Place of Snow on
the Peaks."20 The Hopis believe that kachinas, symbols of the perfect spiritual
beings that the Hopis hope to become after death,2' reside in the Peaks.22
Kachinas represent supernatural beings who may help people if they are asked
properly and respectfully. 23 The Hopis believe that kachinas may take the form
of clouds and bring rain.24 Like the Navajos, the Hopis gather plants and herbs
from the Peaks for use in religious ceremonies. 25 The Peaks are a major
14. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1064.
15. 1 Sw. REGION, FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T. OFAGRIC., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT FOR ARIZONA SNOWBOWL FACILITIES IMPROVEMENTS 1-11 (Feb. 2005), available
at http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/coconino/nepa/2005/feis-snowbowl/ snowbowl-zip-files/vol-1.zip
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT]. Thirteen tribes or chapters, representing
the Hopis, Navajos, Zunis, Acomas, Apaches, Hualapais, Havasupais, Yavapais, and Southern
Paiutes were contacted by the Forest Service during the preparation of its Environmental Impact
Statement required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Id.
16. See KLARA BONSACK KELLEY & HARRIS FRANCIS, NAVAJO SACRED PLACES 94-95
(1994).
17. See ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 15, at 3-11.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Appellant Hopi Tribe's Brief of Appeal at 3, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535
F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2763 (2009) (Nos. 06-15371, 06-
15436, 06-15455), 2006 WL 2429669.
21. See JOHN D. LOFTIN, RELIGION AND HOPI LIFE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 109 (2d.
ed. 2003).
22. Id. at 49.
23. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 15, at 3-10.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 3-9.
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landmark featured in many Hopi folk tales and oral traditions.26 Both the Hopis
and Navajos conduct religious ceremonies on the Peaks.27
A recreational ski resort known as the Snowbowl is located on the highest
of the Peaks, Humphrey's Peak.2 8 The Snowbowl occupies 777 acres of the
Peaks.29 The resort depends on natural snowfall during the ski season, but in
recent years the snowfall has decreased, resulting in operating losses that
threaten the viability of the ski park.30
In response to the shortage of natural snowfall and the drop in revenue
caused by it, the Snowbowl contracted with the nearby City of Flagstaff to
provide 1.5 million gallons oftreated sewage effluent per day to create artificial
snow.3 1 Sewage effluent is made from recycled (or "reclaimed") wastewater.32
The wastewater is treated via a chemical and mechanical process that removes
most of, but not all, the bacteria and microscopic pathogens found within it. 3
Because detectable quantities ofbacteria cannot be removed by this process and
thus remain in the effluent, it is not safe for human consumption as it is not pure
water.34 The State of Arizona has approved the use of treated effluent for
irrigation and landscaping.s
Because the proposed plan takes place on government-owned property, the
U.S. Forest Service was required to act in accordance with the National
26. Id. at 3-10.
27. Id. at 3-12.
28. NavajoNation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1064(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1065. In dry years, the skiing facilities are open as few as four days. Conversely,
in years with abundant natural snowfall the park was open as many as 139 days. Id. at 1082
(Fletcher, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 1082 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
32. Judge Fletcher notes in his dissent that proponents of the plan euphemistically refer to
sewage effluent as "reclaimed water." Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
33. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 15, at 3-199.
Enteric microbial pathogens in wastewater are substantially removed by
conventional treatment, although they are not completely eliminated even with
disinfection. Fecal coliform bacteria, which are used as an indicator of microbial
pathogens, are typically found at concentrations ranging from 10s to 10' colony-
forming units per 100 milliliters (CFU/100 ml) in untreated wastewater.
Advanced wastewater treatment may remove as much as 99.9999+ percent of the
fecal coliform bacteria; however, the resulting effluent has detectable levels of
enteric bacteria, viruses, and protozoa, including Cryptosporidium and Giardia.
Id. For a description of the wastewater-treatment process, see id. at 3-202.
34. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1083 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
35. Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)." NEPA requires federal agencies to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) if their actions will
significantly affect the human environment.37 The Forest Service determined
that the proposed plan would significantly affect the environment, so it prepared
an EIS pursuant to NEPA." The EIS considered the relevant implications of
this measure, including the effect on the tribes' exercise of religion."
The Hopis believe that snow generated on the Peaks is a result of the
kachinas and that this method of artificial snowmaking would desecrate those
beliefs.40 Both the Hopi and Navajo tribes believe that wastewater cannot be
purified and that the use of sewage effluent would negatively impact the
spiritual beings living on the Peaks.4 ' The Forest Service determined that the
use of sewage effluent "[w]ould further contaminate the spiritual purity of the
entire Peaks beyond the historic and existing levels."42 Despite concluding that
the proposed plan would adversely affect the tribes, the Forest Service approved
the plan.43
B. A Legal History
The San Francisco Peaks are the focus of a long battle between the
preservation of tribal religion and custom and the development and
maintenance of a ski resort in northern Arizona. The Forest Service built a road
and ski lodge in 1937." This became the Snowbowl, and it has been used for
downhill skiing ever since.45 In 1977, the Forest Service transferred the
operating permit for the Snowbowl to Northland Recreation Company."
Northland submitted plans to construct additional ski lifts, parking lots, and
lodges.47 Pursuant to NEPA, the Forest Service prepared an EIS detailing the
36. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4368 (2006).
37. Id. § 4332(C).
38. See ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 15.
39. See id at 3-7 to -30.
40. See id. at 3-17. The EIS quotes a statement made at a meeting with the Hopis: "[I]f
Snowbowl makes their own snow, the Katsinam will say: 'they can make their own moisture,
they don't need us' and they will leave. Snowmaking would desecrate our beliefs. Let the
Katsinam make the moisture." Id. at 3-17 to -18.
41. Id. at 3-17.
42. Id. at 3-18.
43. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
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impact renovations would have on the Navajo and Hopi tribes. 48 In 1979, the
Forest Service ultimately decided to allow development on the Peaks. 49 In
1981, the Hopi tribe, the Navajo Medicinemen's Association, and nearby
ranchers initiated suit to halt development under the Free Exercise Clause ofthe
First Amendment.so They argued that because the San Francisco Peaks were
sacred, the development would cause the Peaks to lose their spiritual healing
power and would cease to benefit the tribes." The Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit held that because the government did not impair the tribes'
physical access to the Peaks, it did not burden their religious practices under the
Free Exercise Clause. Thus, development was allowed to continue.5 2
C. The Current Lawsuit
Following the Forest Service's approval of the Snowbowl plan, numerous
tribes brought suit in federal court, alleging inter alia that the Forest Service's
approval of the plan violated RFRA." Specifically, the tribes argued that the
use of sewage effluent on the mountain placed a substantial burden on their free
exercise of religion and that the government must demonstrate both that the use
of effluent furthers a compelling interest and that the burden placed on the
tribes is the least-restrictive means of accomplishing that interest. 54
The district court found the proposed action did not violate RFRA because
the tribes failed to demonstrate a substantial burden.s5 The district court
determined that to demonstrate a "substantial burden" the tribes must show that
the proposed plan "coerces them into violating their religious beliefs or
penalizes their religious activity."" Holding that the dispersal of sewage
effluent on a mountaintop does neither of these, the court determined the Forest
48. Id. at 738-39.
49. Id. at 739.
50. Id.
51. Id at 740.
52. Id.
53. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). The plaintiffs also brought suit under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, the Grand Canyon National Park Enlargement Act of 1975,
and the National Forest Management Act of 1976. The district court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment on all claims except the RFRA claim. Id.
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006) (providing general elements ofa claim under RFRA).
55. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1066-67.
56. Id. (quoting Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d. 866, 905 (D. Ariz.
2006), af'd, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009)).
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Service did not violate RFRA and thus did not have to demonstrate a
compelling interest."
The tribes appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Relying on a statutory interpretation of RFRA, a three-judge panel of Ninth
Circuitjudges reversed, holding that the proposed action substantially burdened
the tribal members' free exercise of religion under RFRA and that the
government had not advanced a compelling interest."
The Forest Service moved for rehearing, which was granted, and the case
went before the Ninth Circuit en banc." Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit
vacated the judgment of the panel and affirmed the district court's ruling,
holding the Forest Service did not substantially burden the tribes because it did
not threaten criminal sanctions or deny a government benefit."o The court relied
on the same substantial-burden analysis as the district court-that "substantial
burden" should be defined only as a denial of a government benefit under
Sherbert v. Verner or a threat of incarceration or other punishment under
Wisconsin v. Yoder.6"
III. Background
The Free Exercise Clause is found in the First Amendment.62 It provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ." The Court has broadly interpreted
what constitutes "religion" within the context of the First Amendment:
[T]he test of belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a
given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the
life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such
beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders
we cannot say that one is "in a relation to a Supreme Being" and the
other is not.'
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1067.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1078.
61. See id. at 1069-78 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
63. Id.
64. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965) (holding that an agnostic was
entitled to receive an exemption from the Selective Service).
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A. The Foundation of the Modem Free Exercise Clause: Sherbert and Yoder
Sherbert v. Verner" supplies the modern framework for interpreting the Free
Exercise Clause. Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist
Church, was fired because she refused to work on Saturdays." The Seventh-
day Adventist Church recognizes Saturday as the Sabbath Day, and Sherbert
refused to work because it would violate her religious beliefs.67 After losing her
job, Sherbert was unable to find any other employment that would not compel
her to work on Saturdays, so she filed for state unemployment benefits in South
Carolina." Sherbert was subsequently denied unemployment benefits by the
Employment Security Commission because she failed to accept suitable work
when offered."
After the Commission denied Sherbert unemployment benefits, she
challenged its decision on the basis that it was prohibiting her free exercise of
religion in violation of the First Amendment.70 Justice Brennan, writing for the
United States Supreme Court, concluded that a mere rational basis for a law that
prohibits granting unemployment benefits because of one's religious practices
would not justify such a substantial infringement on the free exercise of
religion.7 1 He crafted a four-part test to determine whether a claim under the
Free Exercise Clause would stand. For the first part of the Sherbert test, a court
must determine whether the claim involves a sincere religious belief.72 Next,
a court must look to whether the government act imposes a burden on the
individual's free exercise of religion." If an individual makes such a showing
on the first two parts, the burden passes to the government to demonstrate that
a compelling state interest justifies refusing to grant an exemption and that its
actions are the least-restrictive means of achieving that interest.74
65. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
66. Id. at 399.
67. Id. at 399-400.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 401.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 406.
72. See id. at 402 n. 1. "No question has been raised in this case concerning the sincerity
of appellant's religious beliefs." Id.
73. Id. at 403. It is worth noting that the Court in Sherbert does not use the phrase
"substantial burden."
74. Id. at 406-09.
[Vol. 34158
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The Supreme Court reinforced its Sherbert framework in Wisconsin v.
Yoder." A Wisconsin law required parents to enroll their children in public or
private schools up to the age of sixteen." The respondents Jonas Yoder and
Wallace Miller were members ofthe Old Order Amish religion, and respondent
Adin Yutzy was a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church."
The respondents did not enroll their children, aged fourteen and fifteen, in a
private or public school because it was contrary to their religions and ways of
life? Yoder was found guilty of violating the law and was fined a nominal
amount.79
Applying the Sherbert test, the Supreme Court first acknowledged that the
record indicated the Amish claims were "rooted in religious belief."so The
Court then turned to the second and third parts of the test. In examining the
burden on the Amish claimants, the Court determined that the burden was "not
only severe, but inescapable" because the law compelled them to act contrary
to their religious beliefs under threat of criminal sanction.' The Court found
the State failed to show that compulsory education beyond the eighth grade was
sufficient enough of a state interest to outweigh the burden on the Amish's
religion. 82
B. The Dry Period: Few Religious Exemptions Granted Outside the
Unemployment Context
After the ruling in Yoder, the Court stalled in allowing more protection for
free-exercise claimants outside of the unemployment-benefits framework. A
trend appeared where the Court would refuse to grant an exemption because
doing so would undermine the purpose of the state system or because the
situation and circumstances were themselves unique.83
75. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
76. Id. at 207 n.2.
77. Id. at 207.
78. Id. at 209.
79. Id. at 208.
80. Id. at 215-16.
81. Id. at 218.
82. Id. at 227. "Against this background it would require a more particularized showing
from the State on this point to justify the severe interference with religious freedom such
additional compulsory attendance would entail." Id. (emphasis added). The Court does not use
the phrase "substantial burden" in Yoder.
83. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that
logging and construction of roads in a national forest on land sacred to Native Americans did
not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the government was acting internally with respect
to its own land); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (holding that Native American parents
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
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C. Smith and Laws of General Applicability
In 1990, the Supreme Court declined to use the Sherbert test in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.' The respondents,
members of the Native American Church, ingested peyote as part of a religious
ceremony.ss Because of this, they were fired from their jobs with a private
drug-rehabilitation organization." They applied for state unemployment
benefits, but were deemed ineligible because they were fired for work-related
misconduct." Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, read heavily into the use of
the word "prohibiting" in the Free Exercise Clause." The Court determined
that requiring compliance with a law of general applicability that is neutral
toward religion, even if it burdens religion, does not prohibit the free exercise
of religion within the context of the First Amendment.89
D. Congress Reacts to Smith: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993
1. Enactment ofRFRA
In response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Smith, Congress passed RFRA
to afford protection against laws of general applicability that are neutral to
religion, but which nevertheless burden the free exercise ofreligion.90 Congress
found that "in Employment Division v. Smith the Supreme Court virtually
were not entitled to an exemption from assignment of a Social Security number, despite the
belief that it would rob their child's spirit, because the Free Exercise Clause does not allow an
individual to attack the government's own work); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(holding that an Orthodox Jewish soldier was not entitled to an exemption from an Air Force
rule barring the wearing of headgear indoors because the purpose of military rules is to instill
order and uniformity); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that tax-
exempt status for a non-profit organization that practiced racial discrimination based on biblical
interpretation would undermine the State's interest in preventing racial discrimination); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that Social Security tax exemption for the Amish
would undermine the State program).
84. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
85. Id. at 874.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 876-77. "The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment ... provides that
'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. . . .' Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added)).
89. Id. at 878-79.
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2006).
160 [Vol. 34
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eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious
exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion .. "91 RFRA provides that
the government shall not substantially burden the free exercise of religion,
with an exception made only if the government can demonstrate that it is
acting in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and that its actions
are the least-restrictive means of furthering that interest." Congress realized
that laws neutral toward religion may nevertheless burden one's exercise of
religion and that the Founding Fathers sought to preserve this free and
unburdened exercise." Congress stated that the purpose of RFRA was "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in [Sherbert] and [Yoder] and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened."94 Because of the widespread unpopularity of the
Smith decision, RFRA easily passed both houses of Congress with bipartisan
support."
2. Constitutional Problems
Immediately after the enactment of RFRA, numerous scholars and
commentators questioned whether Congress could constitutionally dictate the
standard of review for courts." The Supreme Court answered this question in
91. Id. § 2000bb(a)(4) (citation omitted).
92. Id. § 2000bb-l(b) ("Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.").
93. Id. § 2000bb(a) ("The Congress finds that-(1) the framers of the Constitution,
recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First
Amendment to the Constitution; (2) laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise. . . .
94. Id. § 2000bb(b)(1) (citations omitted).
95. See 139 CONG. REc. 27,239-41 (reporting that the House had no objection to the request
for unanimous consent); id. at 26,416 (reporting that the Senate voted in favor of passing RFRA
by a vote of 97-3).
96. See, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for
RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995); Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, Why theReligious Freedom Restoration ActIs Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 437 (1994); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the
Fox into the Henhouse Under Cover ofSection 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOzO
L. REV. 357 (1994); Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the
Limits ofLegislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247 (1994); William P. Marshall, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56
MONT. L. REV. 227 (1995); William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DuKE L.J. 291 (1996).
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City of Boerne v. Flores." In City of Boerne, Catholic Archbishop Patrick
Flores was denied a zoning permit by the City of Boerne, Texas to expand his
church to accommodate the members of his growing congregation." Flores
brought suit under various claims, including RFRA, which were appealed to
the Supreme Court.99 The Supreme Court held that Congress lacked the power
to enact RFRA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that RFRA
was unconstitutional insofar as it applied to state governments.100
In 2006, however, the Court reaffirmed in an 8-0 opinion that RFRA was
constitutional as applied to the federal government. In Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, U.S. Customs inspectors seized a large
shipment of hoasca, an herbal tea from South America."0 ' Hoasca is used by
members of 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao de Vegetal (UDV), a
Christian Spiritist sect originally based in Brazil, to receive communion.'0 2
Hoasca is made from two plants, one of which contains a hallucinogen that is
enhanced by the other plant.0 3 The hallucinogen is classified as a Schedule
I substance under the Controlled Substances Act.'" UDV brought suit,
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief, on the basis that applying the
Controlled Substance Act to UDV's sacramental use of hoasca violated
RFRA. 05 The Court determined that UDV demonstrated a substantial burden
on its sincere exercise of religion and that the government failed to
demonstrate that application of the Controlled Substance Act to UDV would
further a compelling interest.o' The Court recognized that the protections
under RFRA were not required under the Free Exercise Clause, but that
through RFRA Congress had determined the judiciary should strike a balance
97. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
98. Id. at 512.
99. Id.
100. Id at 536. In addition, Justice Stevens's concurrence stated that RFRA violated the
Establishment Clause because it benefitted owners ofreligious property. Id. at 536-3 7 (Stevens,
J., concurring). In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, however,
Justice Roberts, writing for an undivided Court, concluded that City of Boerne held RFRA
unconstitutional only as applied to the states under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
546 U.S. 418, 424 n.1 (2006).




105. Id. at 425-26.




between the burden on religion and the government's own compelling
interest.'0 7
E. Congressional Quid Pro Quo: The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of2000
Despite the decision in City ofBoerne, which invalidated RFRA as applied
to the states, Congress still perceived a legislative need to bolster the religious
protections offered by the First Amendment. Namely, Congress was still
concerned with the actions of state government that may indirectly burden the
exercise of religion. City ofBoerne made clear that Congress could not afford
greater protection under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, so Congress
looked to its original authority under the Commerce Clause.'o Congress
passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA) in an attempt to provide religious claimants protection against state
laws of general applicability.o' Congress did this by conditioning federal
funding on compliance with the Act."o The Act was so popular that it passed
both houses of Congress with unanimous consent."' RLUIPA applies to two
topics: prisonersll 2 and zoning." 3
RLUIPA uses language similar to that in RFRA. RLUIPA employs a
compelling-interest test whenever the government "imposes a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person."" 4 Unlike RFRA, RLUIPA does
not cite Supreme Court precedent, yet it leates "substantial burden" as an
undefined term. The Supreme Court has held that RLUIPA passes
constitutional muster on a prisoner-related matter,"' but has not ruled
regarding the constitutionality of the zoning provisions of the Act.
107. Id. at 438.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to "regulate commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2006).
110. Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A).
111. See 146 CONG. REc. 16,621-22 (reporting that the House had no objection to the request
for unanimous consent); id. at 16,703 (reporting that the Senate had no objection to the request
for unanimous consent).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
113. Id. § 2000cc-1.
114. Id. § 2000cc(a)(1) (affecting land use regulations); see also id. § 2000cc-l(a) (affecting
institutionalized persons).
115. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713-18 (2005) (holding that prisoners in federally
funded facilities may not be refused religious accommodations).
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F. Shifting Tests: A BriefAnalysis of the Reasons Behind Smith's
Departure from Previous Jurisprudence
Since the Supreme Court held that RLUIPA was constitutional, Congress
has left the free-exercise area relatively undisturbed. Lower courts have
struggled with applying RFRA to federal cases because the Supreme Court
declined to interpret certain provisions of RFRA, and with the passing of
RLUIPA, Congress has seemingly forgotten about its original religious-
freedom act."' Particularly difficult for lower courts has been the basis of how
to interpret RFRA: whether to utilize a constitutional approach or a strict
statutory approach. Indeed, RFRA seems to blur the lines between
constitutional and statutory law.
The courts in the Navajo Nation litigation are no different. The courts
cannot agree on how to define "substantial burden." Whether to confine it
only to the facts of Sherbert and Yoder, to use all of the cases preceding Smith,
or merely to look at the plain meaning of the statutory language, this language
has confused the lower courts and left this specific area of law unsettled.
IV Analysis
A. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of RFRA Is Too Narrow to Fulfill
Congress's Intent to Expand First Amendment Protection
The intent of Congress in enacting RFRA was to protect the free exercise
of religion "by provid[ing] a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government."' " The centerpiece of this
idea was the protection of religion against encroachment by acts of the
government. After the Supreme Court ruling in Smith, Congress realized that
the free exercise of religion could be significantly and adversely affected by
the government, perhaps even where the government did not consider the
impact on religion when it acted. This rings true because the impact realized
by those who are substantially burdened by government action is no different
if the government's action were neutral to religion than if it were specifically
targeting religion. The harm to the free exercise of religion is the same. The
purpose of RFRA was to prevent this infringement on the exercise of religion
regardless of whether the law is neutral to religion on its face.
116. Congress, however, did amend RFRA when it passed RLUIPA. The amendment had
the effect of correcting the provisions of RFRA that were held unconstitutional in City of
Boerne.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(2).
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Of special concern were minority religions, which are perhaps overlooked
or given less deference by those participating in majority religions. Justice
O'Connor noted in Smith that the First Amendment was proffered to afford
protection to such minority religions, and those religions face a much greater
probability of being affected by laws of general applicability than do members
of mainstream religions whose interests and beliefs are of wide public
knowledge.'
This is not to say that the government may never act in a manner that
substantially burdens religion. Rather, Congress devised RFRA in a way that
merely provides the same compelling-interest test to laws neutral toward
religion as the Court had provided to laws that are not neutral. This levels the
playing field as far as religious observers are concerned because their exercise
of religion may not be burdened by the federal government unless the
government has a compelling reason to do so.
Congress perceived that the threat to religion was especially great to
minority or non-mainstream religions. Congress specifically stated its
disapproval of Smith, in which the respondents were members of the Native
American Church. Minority religions need enhanced protection because the
nature of these religions may not be adequately understood by the mainstream
or the government.
Unlike the mainstream Judeo-Christian religions that dominate not only the
U.S. population as a whole but also correlatively those individuals who
comprise the government, many religions put a heavy importance on specific
natural sites. Often, these natural sites are viewed as living supernatural
beings. Indeed, the San Francisco Peaks are viewed in this manner by the
tribes that brought suit against the Forest Service."" Because government
actors may not understand the significance of such natural sites to religious
observers, they are unlikely to appreciate the impact their actions will have on
them.
118. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("[Tihe First Amendment was enacted precisely to
protect the rights of those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be
viewed with hostility. The history of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh
impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups such as the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Amish.").
119. See ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 15, at 3-7 to -8.
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B. Congress Intended to Incorporate Only the Compelling-Interest Test of
Sherbert and Yoder and Did Not Intend to Limit the Definition of
"Substantial Burden" to the Facts of Those Cases
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals abruptly and all-too-simply infers that
Congress intended to limit the definition of "substantial burden" only to those
cases that exhibit the same fact patterns as those of Sherbert and Yoder. This
conclusion is erroneous because the government could act however it wanted,
regardless of the substantial burden on religion, so long as it did not deny
benefits or criminalize behavior. The dissent notes this, citing an example of
clearing a forest and paving over all of the sacred sites.120 Interpreting
"substantial burden" in this manner would significantly diminish the protection
of the free exercise of religion and contradicts the stated purpose of RFRA.
The Ninth Circuit fails to acknowledge that if Congress wanted to limit
RFRA in this manner, it could have explicitly stated so, as it specifically
mentioned three cases in the statute. Because the Ninth Circuit did examine
the express language to interpret other areas of the statute,121 it is noteworthy
that it failed to mention the ease with which Congress could have avoided
ambiguity by specifically limiting the statute to those two fact patterns (denial
of a benefit and criminalization of behavior).
It is unlikely that Congress intended to act so narrowly because it
specifically cited Supreme Court cases in the text of the law, 122 which is
exceptionally rare for congressional statutes. The more likely possibility is
that Congress, in expanding the protection of the exercise of religion, wanted
the judiciary to determine "substantial burden" on a case-by-case basis.
C. Reading RFRA in Such a Narrow Context Provides Little Additional
Protection for the Exercise ofReligion
Interpreting the definition of "substantial burden" to apply only to
government actions that criminalize behavior or deny government benefits
offers minimal additional protection for the exercise of religion. This
interpretation is directly against the will of Congress. Immediately after the
Supreme Court decided Smith, both parties in Congress began working on
legislation that would ultimately become RFRA.
120. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763.
121. Id. at 1068-69.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
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It is clear that Congress was unhappy with the ruling in Smith and felt that
it was a departure from previous constitutional law. This could indeed be the
case, considering the language employed by the Smith opinion. The Court
effectively wrote that Sherbert never existed: "We have never held that an
individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."l 2 3 Congress
merely wanted to "restore" the protections offered by the First Amendment as
interpreted in Sherbert and Yoder.124  The problem was that Congress
attempted to override the Supreme Court's definition of the fundamental
liberties granted under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive
due process. This was outside of Congress's power. Congress, however,
could still provide greater rights to the federal branch pursuant to its Article
I powers under the Constitution.
If RFRA applies only to substantial burdens that are the denial of
governmental benefits or threats of incarceration, then there is no measurable
increase of the protection of the free exercise of religion. RFRA is designed
to protect against laws that are neutral toward religion. A law that threatens
incarceration for following a religion, however, would not be neutral toward
religion.'25 In Yoder, the Supreme Court struck down a law that threatened to
imprison Amish parents who did not send their children to secondary school;
the Court held this invalid under the First Amendment. The First Amendment
already protects against laws that threaten this type of liberty. Any law that
would have this effect would be unconstitutional under the First
Amendment-there would be no reason for a RFRA analysis.
The denial of governmental benefits may be somewhat different. The
denial of benefits under Sherbert was held to be unconstitutional, but the
denial of benefits under Smith was not. Smith had the effect of overruling
Sherbert, and RFRA merely restored the Sherbert standard for laws passed by
the federal government. So perhaps RFRA would offer somewhat more
protection for this type of burden than would current Supreme Court
jurisprudence under Smith. Even keeping this in mind, it cannot be argued that
Congress intended only this limited expansion of protection because it
mentioned Yoder as well. A much more plausible explanation is that Congress
intended to restore what had been a rollback of First Amendment protections
in the cases following Sherbert and Yoder.
123. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
125. See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522. 1531 (9th Cir. 1997).
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This explanation is especially persuasive since Congress did not limit
"substantial burden" to the facts of Sherbert and Yoder. The term "substantial
burden" is not stated in either of those cases. "Burden" and "significant
burden" are stated in these cases. "Substantial burden" is not a term of art
defined in those cases and was first coined in text accompanying a string cite
in a subsequent Supreme Court case. 12 6 Perhaps it would have been easier for
Congress to state that the government may not pass laws that deny government
benefits or threaten incarceration without a compelling interest. But Congress
did not do this, instead alluding specifically to the Yoder, Sherbert, and Smith
cases in the text of RFRA.
Additionally, the specific language employed in the statute indicates that
Congress did not intend to define "substantial burden" by the facts of Sherbert
and Yoder, but expressed only the intention to use the compelling-interest test
as used in those two cases. The Ninth Circuit greatly confuses this point.
D. The Ninth Circuit Should Have Applied a Substantial Burden Test to the
Facts of the Case
Because Congress did not expressly limit "substantial burden" to the facts
of Sherbert and Yoder, the Ninth Circuit should have independently evaluated
whether the use of recycled sewage effluent on a sacred Native American site
substantially burdens the claimants' free exercise of religion. Although,
admittedly, it may be unclear what constitutes a substantial burden, there must
be a test. Some circuit courts have previously applied tests under RLUIPA.127
The Ninth Circuit should have applied principles of statutory interpretation
to define "substantial burden," not those of constitutional interpretation.
Presumably because of the absence of specific cases cited in RLUIPA, the
lower courts have treated "substantial burden" according to its plain and clear
meaning.128
The failure of the Ninth Circuit to independently analyze whether the use
of sewage effluent on the mountain constitutes a substantial burden effectively
robs the Navajo Nation of the opportunity to succeed on a RFRA claim
because the test stops there and does not proceed to the compelling-interest test
126. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1088-89 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (citing Hernandez v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)).
127. See, e.g., Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
denial ofhalal or kosher meats to a Muslim prisoner could constitute a substantial burden under
RLUIPA); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 197-99 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that a prisoner has
rights under RLUIPA to religious diet).
128. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1093-95 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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specified in the statute. Although the court does not fully elaborate on this
matter, it is unlikely that making a private ski resort more profitable would
fulfill a compelling government interest. Even if it did, it would not pass the
least-restrictive-means test since there are other ways to create artificial
snow.129
V Conclusion
The protection of the free exercise of religion was paramount to our
Founding Fathers. Through judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court held
that laws that are neutral toward religion may nevertheless substantially burden
the exercise of religion. Congress, concerned about the practical implications
of this pronouncement, passed RFRA to afford protection to minority and non-
mainstream religions that perhaps are not given as much consideration by the
federal government. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' application of
RFRA effectively strips any additional protection of the free exercise of
religion by interpreting "substantial burden" to mean only those government
acts that deny a government benefit or criminalize behavior. In the case of the
Navajo Nation, the Hopi, and other tribes, this has the effect of allowing
millions of gallons of sewage effluent to be sprayed on their holiest sites.
129. For example, by using water to manufacture artificial snow instead of sewage effluent.
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